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CASE COMMENT 
CONFIRMATION OF A CATCH-22: GLIK V. CUNNIFFE AND THE 
PARADOX OF CITIZEN RECORDING 
Glik v. Cunniffe, No. 10-1764, 2011 WL 3769092 
(1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2011) 
Caycee Hampton* 
On October 1, 2007, Simon Glik observed several police officers 
arresting a young man on the Boston Common.1 Concerned that the 
officers were employing excessive force, Glik began to record the arrest 
with his cell phone. After successfully arresting the young man, an 
officer asked Glik whether the cell phone had recorded audio. When 
Glik replied in the affirmative, the officer arrested Glik for “unlawful 
audio recording in violation of Massachusetts’s wiretap statute.”2 Glik 
was ultimately charged with three state law offenses: (1) violating the 
state wiretap statute,3 (2) disturbing the peace,4 and (3) aiding in the 
escape of a prisoner.5 
The Commonwealth voluntarily dismissed the count of aiding in the 
escape of a prisoner, and a Boston municipal court disposed of the 
remaining two charges in response to Glik’s motion to dismiss.6 In 
particular, the court “found no probable cause supporting the wiretap 
charge, because the law requires a secret recording and the officers 
admitted that Glik had used his cell phone openly and in plain view to 
obtain the video and audio recording.”7 Following a fruitless filing of 
his complaint with the Boston Police Department,8 Glik filed an action 
against the arresting officers and the City of Boston in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts. Glik’s complaint included, in 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. History, 
2009, University of Florida. I dedicate this Comment to Kyle for his genuine interest in the 
rights of a citizen recorder. Special thanks to Allison Fischman, Kathryn Kimball, and Paul 
Pakidis for their encouragement and expertise. 
 1. The Boston Common is the oldest public park in the United States and is well known 
as “a stage for free speech and public assembly.” The Boston Common, FREEDOM TRAIL, 
http://www.thefreedomtrail.org/visitor/boston-common.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). 
 2. Glik v. Cunniffe, No. 10-1764, 2011 WL 3769092, at *1 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2011). 
 3. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (West 2011)). 
 4. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 53(b)). 
 5. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 17). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Following Glik’s filing of an internal affairs complaint with the Boston Police 
Department, the Department neither “investigate[d] his complaint [n]or initiate[d] disciplinary 
action against the arresting officers.” Id. at *2. 
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relevant part, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 for violation of Glik’s 
First and Fourth Amendment rights.10 
The officers moved to dismiss Glik’s complaint based on qualified 
immunity,11 but the district court concluded that “in the First 
Circuit . . . th[e] First Amendment right publicly to record the activities 
of police officers on public business is established.”12 The district court 
consequently denied the officers’ motion to dismiss, and the officers 
appealed.13 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit limited its review to 
the issue of qualified immunity, which is immediately appealable on 
interlocutory review.14 The court ultimately ruled that, “though not 
unqualified, a citizen’s right to film government officials, including law 
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is 
a basic, vital, and well-established liberty safeguarded by the First 
Amendment,”15 and that, because Glik’s recording was not “‘secret’ 
within the meaning of Massachusetts’s wiretap statute . . . the officers 
lacked probable cause to arrest him.”16 Accordingly, upon determining 
that the officers had violated Glik’s clearly established constitutional 
rights, the court of appeals held that the district court did not err in 
denying qualified immunity to the appellants on Glik’s First and Fourth 
Amendment claims.17 
 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). This section states 
that: 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
Id. 
 10. Glik’s complaint also included state law claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights 
Act and a claim for malicious prosecution. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *2. 
 11. Id. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available to a defendant–official 
accused of violating the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815 (1982). In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the test for qualified immunity 
inquires (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional 
right and, if so, (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s 
alleged violation. See infra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
 12. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at *7. 
 16. Id. at *9. 
 17. Id. at *9–10. 
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The essential holding of Glik v. Cunniffe establishes that the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects a citizen’s right to film18 
law enforcement officers in a public space, and it further conveys that 
arresting a citizen for disobeying a state wiretap statute by recording a 
law enforcement officer in a public space violates that citizen’s Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. This Comment 
argues that, in situations involving citizen recording of law enforcement 
official conduct, the court’s holding merely identifies an incongruity in 
the practical application of the First and Fourth Amendments and fails 
to offer any constructive guidance to citizens unsure of their right to 
record. 
Addressing Glik’s ironic outcome necessitates a brief explanation of 
the relevant historical treatment of (1) the law of qualified immunity, 
(2) a citizen’s constitutional rights under the First and Fourth 
Amendments, and (3) the Massachusetts wiretap law. After providing 
the applicable background, this Comment will apply the law to the 
circumstances of Glik and explain the dilemma that emerges from the 
court’s decision. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized qualified immunity as a 
principle that “balances two important interests—the need to hold 
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and 
the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability 
when they perform their duties reasonably.”19 The Court established the 
standard for evaluating the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.20 In that case, the Court explained that qualified 
immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”21 This standard, the Court emphasized, contains no 
subjective component but instead evaluates the objective reasonableness 
of an official’s conduct.22 
The First Circuit announced the law of qualified immunity in 
Maldonado v. Fontanes.23 Maldonado sets forth a two-part test that 
requires a court to decide “(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the 
plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Note that although the Glik court phrased its First Amendment holding in terms of the 
right to “film” government officials, the state wiretap statute at issue specifically criminalizes 
the interception of “wire or oral” communications. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
Thus, this Comment focuses on the legality of audio, as opposed to video, recording. 
 19. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *2 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 
(2009)). 
 20. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 21. Id. at 818; see Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *2 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800, 807). 
 22. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.  
 23. 568 F.3d 263 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s 
alleged violation.”24 The second inquiry may simply be phrased as 
“whether the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave 
the defendant fair warning that his particular conduct was 
unconstitutional.”25 This two-part test supplies the framework for the 
holding in Glik. 
The constitutional rights evaluated in Glik through the perspective of 
this qualified immunity test include those guaranteed to citizens by the 
First and Fourth Amendments. The First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution guarantees that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”26 In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti,27 the Supreme Court observed that “the First 
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression 
of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.”28 The Court 
also acknowledged in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.29 that an important part 
of protecting the stock of public information is the principle that 
“[t]here is an undoubted right to gather news ‘from any source by 
means within the law.’”30 Furthermore, in Mills v. Alabama,31 the Court 
explained that “a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,” and that “the 
press . . . was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of 
power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means 
for keeping officials . . . responsible to all the people whom they were 
selected to serve.”32 
In Iacobucci v. Boulter,33 the First Circuit recognized that a peaceful 
citizen’s act of recording a public official, without violating any law, 
constituted an exercise of that citizen’s First Amendment rights.34 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *2 (quoting Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269). 
 25. Id. at *3 (quoting Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *3–7 (discussing whether the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Glik’s First Amendment claim). 
 27. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 28. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *3 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783). 
 29. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 30. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *3 (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (quoting Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82 (1972))). 
 31. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
 32. Id. at 218–19; Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *4 (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 218). 
 33. 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 34. See Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *4. In Iacobucci, the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 centered on a Fourth Amendment violation, as the plaintiff was not arrested under a state 
wiretap statute but rather charged with “disorderly conduct” and “disrupting a public assembly.” 
193 F.3d at 18, 21. However, the court reasoned that “because Iacobucci’s activities were 
peaceful, not performed in derogation of any law, and done in the exercise of his First 
Amendment rights, [the defendant–law enforcement officer] lacked the authority to stop them.”  
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Although the citizen in Iacobucci was a journalist, the opinions of other 
circuit courts indicate that the First Amendment similarly protects a 
citizen recorder who lacks affiliation with the “press.” For instance, in 
Smith v. City of Cumming,35 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held that a citizen recorder “had a First Amendment right, 
subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph 
or videotape police conduct.”36 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”37 
Regarding the fundamental protection against unreasonable seizure, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “[n]o right is held more sacred, 
or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.”38 
According to the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Holder 
v. Town of Sandown,39 the Fourth Amendment requires that “at the time 
of the arrest, the ‘facts and circumstances within the officer’s 
knowledge . . . [were] sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the 
suspect [had] committed, [was] committing, or [was] about to commit 
an offense.’”40 In the absence of such an objectively reasonable belief, 
an arrest would violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable seizures. 
The crux of Glik’s police encounter—and Fourth Amendment 
violation—originates in the Massachusetts wiretap statute. The statute 
provides, in relevant part, that “any person who willfully commits an 
interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any other 
person to commit an interception . . . of any wire or oral communication 
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both . . . .”41 The term 
                                                                                                                     
 35. 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 36. Id. at 1333; Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *4 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333). Although 
the Smith court decided that the First Amendment protected the citizen’s recording of police 
conduct, the court also determined that the citizen failed to show that the defendant’s actions 
violated that right. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *7–9 (discussing whether the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Glik’s Fourth Amendment claim). 
 38. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 39. 585 F.3d 500 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 40. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *7 (quoting Holder, 585 F.3d at 504 (quoting Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979))). 
 41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (West 2011); see Glik, 2011 WL 
3760902, at *7 (citing ch. 272, § 99(C)(1)). 
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“interception” means “to secretly hear [or] secretly record . . . the 
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any 
intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior 
authority by all parties to such communication,”42 and an “oral 
communication” is defined as “speech, except such speech as is 
transmitted over the public air waves by radio or other similar device.”43 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts provided extensive 
interpretation of this state law in Commonwealth v. Hyde.44 In Hyde, a 
motorist was prosecuted for violating the Massachusetts wiretap statute 
by tape-recording the comments of on-duty police officers during a 
traffic stop.45 The court rejected the defendant–motorist’s argument that 
“the statute [was] not applicable because the police officers were 
performing their public duties, and, therefore, had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their words.”46 Instead, the court upheld the 
conviction, reasoning that the “defendant was not prosecuted for 
making the recording; he was prosecuted for doing so secretly.”47 The 
court further explained that the motorist could have avoided violating 
the wiretap statute if he had simply informed the officers that he 
intended to record their encounter or, alternatively, held the tape 
recorder in plain sight.48 This “secrecy inquiry” played a significant role 
in the outcome of Glik.49 
Glik’s constitutional analysis followed the structure of the 
Maldonado test.50 Accordingly, the court first addressed whether the 
facts alleged by the plaintiff constituted a violation of a constitutional 
right, and subsequently addressed whether that constitutional right was 
“clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation. 
Through this filter, the court provided a detailed explanation of the First 
and Fourth Amendment rights belonging to a citizen who records a law 
enforcement officer in a public space. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4); see Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *7 (citing 
ch. 272, § 99(B)(4)). 
 43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(2). 
 44. 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2001); see Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *7 (discussing 
Hyde). 
 45. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 964–65. 
 46. Id. at 967. 
 47. Id. at 969. Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall dissented, opining that “[t]he purpose 
of [Massachusetts’s wiretap statute] is not to shield public officials from exposure of their 
wrongdoings.” Id. at 975 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 971. Despite the reasoning in Hyde, the Glik court opted not to extend its First 
Amendment holding to situations like traffic stops. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying 
text. 
 49. See infra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 50. Glik v. Cunniffe, No. 10-1764, 2011 WL 3769092, at *2 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2011). 
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The court framed the First Amendment issue by considering whether 
there is a constitutionally protected right to videotape police carrying 
out their duties in public.51 The Court resolutely answered this inquiry 
in the affirmative. The court reasoned that the First Amendment’s 
protection extends beyond the textual guarantees of freedom of speech 
or of the press and explained that the protection encompasses “a range 
of conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of information.”52 
Next, the court asked whether this right to record was clearly 
established. The court noted that several prior opinions recognizing a 
right to record government officials in a public space were marked by a 
characteristic brevity, which the court interpreted to be indicative of the 
“fundamental and virtually self-evident nature of the First 
Amendment’s protections in this area.”53 Thus, Glik established that the 
right of the citizenry “to film government officials, including law 
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is 
a basic, vital, and well-established liberty safeguarded by the First 
Amendment.”54 
Further adhering to the Maldonado test, the court next addressed the 
potential Fourth Amendment violation. The controversy over the 
existence of a Fourth Amendment violation originated in an 
interpretation of state law; that is, a Fourth Amendment violation is 
predicated upon the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant lacked probable 
cause that the plaintiff was violating some law at the time of arrest.55 In 
Glik, the appellant law enforcement officers argued that “the allegations 
of the complaint establish probable cause that Glik violated 
Massachusetts’s wiretap statute.”56 
Accordingly, the court turned to an interpretation of the 
Massachusetts wiretap law.57 The court found that the “critical limiting 
term in the statute is ‘interception,’ defined to mean ‘to secretly hear 
[or] secretly record . . . .’”58 Explaining that a recording is “secret” 
unless the subject has actual knowledge of the recording, and further 
noting that “actual knowledge” does not require explicit 
acknowledgement of the recording, the court found that “the secrecy 
inquiry turns on notice, i.e., whether, based on objective indicators, such 
as the presence of a recording device in plain view, one can infer that 
the subject was aware that she might be recorded.”59 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at *3. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at *6. 
 54. Id. at *7. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2011). 
 58. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *7 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4)). 
 59. Id. 
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Application of the Glik facts to this “secrecy inquiry”—namely the 
consideration that Glik’s cell phone had been held in plain view—led 
the court to conclude that “Glik’s recording was not ‘secret’ within the 
meaning of Massachusetts’s wiretap statute, and therefore the officers 
lacked probable cause to arrest him.”60 The court further found that 
“[t]he presence of probable cause was not even arguable here,” and thus 
that the lack of probable cause was “clearly established” for the purpose 
of denying the appellants qualified immunity.61 
Glik effectively holds that the right of a citizen to record a law 
enforcement officer in a public space is so entrenched in First 
Amendment precedent that the defense of qualified immunity is 
conclusively inapplicable. Further, the case holds that an arrest based on 
a recording with a device in plain view lacks probable cause for 
purposes of enforcing the state wiretap law and consequently violates 
the Fourth Amendment—again without the defense of qualified 
immunity. While this explanation seems legally rational, it is 
inconsistent with the realistic application of the law; ironically, the case 
itself proves that citizens are still being arrested for what the court 
describes as a “well-established” and “fundamental” principle of law.62 
This holding presents an inconvenient paradox for citizens unsure of 
their right to record. Notably, because several states have enacted 
wiretap statutes similar to that of Massachusetts,63 Glik represents a 
concern of many citizens beyond the jurisdiction of the First Circuit. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at *9. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at *6–7. The authority relied upon by the Glik court to illustrate the longstanding 
nature of the constitutionally protected right to record police officers in public included cases 
such as Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); and Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 
F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999). Each was decided well before Glik’s arrest in 2007. 
 63. California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington each require the consent of all parties to a communication for 
lawful audio recording. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (2010); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1, -2 (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 10-402(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.539(c)–(d) (LexisNexis 
2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(I) 
(LexisNexis 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.73.030(1) (West 2010). But see Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) 
(holding that a participant in a conversation may record that conversation without fear of penalty 
pursuant to the statute—because “eavesdropping” contemplates that the violator would record 
the conversations of others—and thus interpreting Michigan’s wiretap statute to require consent 
of only one party to a communication). The requirement of all-party consent effectively permits 
law enforcement officers to arrest citizen recorders when the officers themselves withhold 
consent to the recording. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues After Mother Falsely 
Arrested by Boynton Beach Police Officers (June 25, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/free-
speech/aclu-sues-after-mother-falsely-arrested-boynton-beach-police-officers. 
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Glik offers no definitive resolution to the question of whether a 
citizen may record a law enforcement officer in the officer’s 
professional capacity. Rather, the case merely provides that each citizen 
retains the right to film law enforcement officers in the discharge of 
their duties “in a public space.”64 This explanation fails to clarify for the 
average American citizen whether the act of filming a law enforcement 
officer is protected by the First Amendment. The answer will depend on 
the factual circumstances of each filming. 
To foreshadow the factual dependence of this First Amendment 
protection, the Glik court strongly distinguished between filming a law 
enforcement officer on the Boston Common and filming an officer 
during a traffic stop,65 reasoning that a traffic stop can be characterized 
as an “inherently dangerous situation[].”66 The court also carefully 
noted that a citizen’s right to film government officials in a public space 
is “not unqualified.”67 Thus, the court’s validation of Glik’s recording 
offers little enduring guidance regarding what “spaces” are “public” 
enough to qualify for First Amendment protection. Practically speaking, 
law enforcement officers may continue to enforce the state wiretap 
statute in any situation less public than an oral communication on the 
Boston Common. 
Of course, regardless of the “public” setting, a realistic concern 
countering the benefits of citizen recording is the police officer’s 
purpose of ensuring public safety. One recent news article 
acknowledged that citizen-recorded videos subject police officer actions 
to new scrutiny and change the way accusations against officers play 
out in court.68 The article claimed that some officers are afraid to use 
necessary force because of “fear of retribution by video” and blamed 
this new pressure on police officers for the recent trend toward police 
enforcement of wiretap laws to limit citizen recording of police 
activity.69  
Interestingly, the Glik opinion referenced this same theme of 
ubiquitous public technology to extend First Amendment protection to 
citizen recorders in public spaces.70 Glik emphatically explained that 
“the public’s right of access to information is coextensive with that of 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *7. 
 65. “[A] traffic stop is worlds apart from an arrest on the Boston Common in the 
circumstances alleged.” Id. at *6.  
 66. Id. (quoting Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. at *7. 
 68. Kevin Johnson, For Cops, Citizen Videos Bring Increased Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Oct. 
15, 2010, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-15-1Avideocops15 
_CV_N.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *5. 
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the press,” and that “[i]t is of no significance that the present 
case . . . involves a private individual, and not a reporter, gathering 
information about public officials.”71 To address the practical issue of 
police interaction with citizen recorders, the court reasoned: 
In our society police officers are expected to endure 
significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their 
First Amendment rights. . . . The same restraint demanded 
of law enforcement officers in the face of “provocative and 
challenging speech” . . . must be expected when they are 
merely the subject of videotaping that memorializes, 
without impairing, their work in public spaces.72 
Law enforcement discomfort with being recorded in public while on 
duty does not, without more, affect the First Amendment protection 
afforded the citizen recorder, nor does it excuse the Fourth Amendment 
violation of arresting a citizen for recording police activity in a public 
space. 
To enforce a policy that intrudes upon an individual’s ability to 
check potential governmental abuse, and to do so without express 
legislative support,73 undermines public confidence in the government. 
The Glik court expressly acknowledged that “[g]athering information 
about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to 
others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and 
promoting ‘the free discussion of governmental affairs.’”74 The court 
further noted: 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at *6 (citations omitted) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 73. The state of Florida provides a fitting example of ambiguous legislative endorsement 
of the state wiretap law as a vehicle to prosecute citizens for filming the police in their capacity 
as public officials. The Florida wiretap statute, FLA. STAT. § 934.03, like its Massachusetts 
counterpart, refers to an “interception” of oral communication. Some Florida judges have 
disagreed over whether the statute was intended to criminalize recordings in addition to 
interceptions. See State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418, 420–31 (Fla. 1981) (Alderman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For instance, in his dissent from the majority opinion 
in Tsavaris, Justice Alderman claimed that the legislature’s choice of the term “interception” 
rather than “recording” was intentional and that “[o]ne does not intercept a conversation made 
directly to himself.” Id. at 431–32. Justice Alderman additionally posited that “[i]f the 
legislature had intended to make it unlawful for any person to record an oral or wire 
communication, it could easily have done so in plain and simple language. It did not. Instead, it 
criminalized only the willful interception of wire or oral communication.” Id. at 432. Justice 
Alderman concluded his dissent with a plea to the legislature to correct what he perceived to be 
a “judicial distortion” of § 934.03. Id. In Massachusetts, the ambiguity lives on regarding the 
extent to which the location of the recorder and the recorded communication influences the First 
Amendment protection of a recording; this ambiguity is fueled partially by disagreement over 
the intended function of the statute. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 74. Glik, 2011 WL 3769092, at *4 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
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“Freedom of expression has particular significance with 
respect to government because ‘[i]t is here that the state has 
a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a 
more effective power of suppression.’” This is particularly 
true of law enforcement officials, who are granted 
substantial discretion that may be misused to deprive 
individuals of their liberties.75 
Citizen recording is a nonviolent and nonintrusive way for citizens to 
hold police officers accountable for their actions while carrying out 
their public service. Indeed, the court noted that, because Glik “‘filmed 
[the officers] from a comfortable remove’ and ‘neither spoke to nor 
molested them in any way,’” Glik’s peaceful recording was not subject 
to limitation.76 Theoretically, the possibility of citizen surveillance 
should incentivize police officers to act in accordance with their 
professional duties at all times. If citizens believe—correctly or 
otherwise—that it is illegal to record unethical police behavior, the 
potential for vigilante filming diminishes, and an important check on 
governmental authority diminishes correspondingly. 
In sum, the Glik court acknowledged that law enforcement officers 
must learn to coexist with the constitutional right of the citizenry to 
record in public spaces, but offered little explanation to clarify the 
instances in which a citizen may rightly assume that she is recording in 
a “public space.” Without additional clarification, citizens will remain 
uncertain about their right to record and will inevitably fall victim to 
unconstitutional arrests due to the imprecise explanation of the “public” 
prerequisite for First Amendment protection. 
In Glik, a citizen’s exercise of a “clearly-established” First 
Amendment right resulted in a “clearly-established” Fourth Amendment 
violation. Although the court unambiguously arrived at this conclusion, 
it failed to provide a bright-line resolution to avoid this discrepancy in 
the future. Apart from recognizing that “a traffic stop is worlds apart 
from an arrest on the Boston Common,”77 the court provided no 
guidance for determining what situations constitute a “public space” in 
which a citizen’s right to film government officials is safeguarded by 
the First Amendment. Absent pronounced boundaries for First 
Amendment protection, citizens who choose to record law enforcement 
officials risk inviting the same Fourth Amendment violation confirmed 
in Glik. 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 
n.11 (1978) (quoting THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 9 (1966))). 
 76. Id. at *5 (quoting Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 77. Id. at *6. 
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